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ABSTRACT 
In the context of the increasing prominence of conditional cash transfers (CCTs) in the 
development agenda of many developing countries, this Country Study provides an analytic 
overview of the challenges faced by El Salvador’s CCT programme, Red Solidaria, (Solidarity 
Network). The purpose is to generate an information base for comparative studies on the prospects 
and potential difficulties of implementing CCTs in country settings different from those of the 
pioneer programmes, such as in Brazil and Mexico. The study describes Red Solidaria´s origins and 
components and discusses major aspects of its design and implementation. A particular emphasis 
is placed on the programme’s co-responsibilities, exit rules and targeting strategy. The study also 
covers the topics of institutional structures, intersectoral coordination and political support for 
such programmes. The conclusion is that Red Solidaria is an informative example of how a small 
country with limited resources can successfully set up a complex CCT programme. Still, the study 
notes that there are pending issues and remaining challenges for the programme. These relate, in 
particular, to strengthening mechanisms of local participation; coordinating the CCTs with other 
dimensions of Red Solidaria, such as productive projects; lengthening the duration of benefits for 
meeting human-capital objectives; clarifying eligibility requirements and how changes in family 
conditions can affect such requirements; and distinguishing conditionalities from ordinary 
programme co-responsibilities. An issue of overriding importance is to develop a broader long-
term social protection strategy for El Salvador, with which CCTs would be integrated instead of 
being regarded as a stand-along programme. 
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1  INTRODUCTION 
Conditional cash transfers (CCTs) have been frequently highlighted as an innovative tool of 
social protection. They combine the short-term objective of alleviating poverty with incentives 
for families to increase their investments in human capital so as to break intergenerational 
poverty traps. Since their first introduction in large, middle-income countries, such as Mexico 
and Brazil in the mid-1990s, they have become popular across Latin America, harnessing 
substantial support from multilateral agencies and donors.  
This Country Study discusses one of the most recent CCTs implemented in the region,  
Red Solidaria, initiated by the government of El Salvador in 2005. In the context of increasing CCT 
prominence in the region’s development agenda, the replicability and sustainability of these 
programmes in country settings where financial and operational frameworks are weaker is an 
issue of major concern. Thus, our purpose is to provide a descriptive and analytic overview of  
Red Solidaria that can generate inputs for comparative studies on the prospects and potential 
difficulties faced by CCTs in countries with settings different from those in the CCT pioneers.  
This study is based on data from three main sources: 1) a review of conceptual and 
operational documents and reports on Red Solidaria’s design and implementation; 2) semi-
structured interviews with programme managers and stakeholders at the national, local and 
international levels; and 3) on-site observation of implementation processes carried out in 
three municipalities targeted by the programme. A list of interviews and field visits that have 
informed this study is presented in the Appendix.  
In Section 2 we present an overview of Red Solidaria’s components and origins. Section 3 
discusses key design and implementation aspects. Section 4 focuses on the programme’s  
co-responsibilities while Section 5 introduces the issue of exit rules or beneficiary graduation. 
Section 6 deals with targeting criteria and mechanisms. Section 7 discusses institutional structures 
and implementing capacity. Section 8 analyses the Red’s intersectoral co-ordination. Section 9 
addresses the issue of sustainability, taking into account financial costs and political support. 
Section 10 concludes by identifying pending issues and challenges faced by the programme. 
2  RED SOLIDARIA’S COMPONENTS AND ORIGINS 
Red Solidaria is the main government programme targeted at the poorest population of  
El Salvador. Besides the cash transfer, it comprises two other components related to 
improvements in the supply of social services and infrastructure and to increases in the 
productivity and diversification of the income sources of poor families (see Box 1).  
The Red’s designers trace its origins to the government plan for 2004-2009 of President 
Antonio Elias Saca, a candidate of the right-wing Alianza Republicana Nacionalista (ARENA). 
This plan outlined the creation of a social safety net for the country’s most vulnerable 
population.1 Interestingly, the government plan of the leftist Frente Farabundo Martí para  
la Liberación Nacional (FMLN) —the other strong contesting party in the 2004 elections—
mentioned under its educational priorities the establishment of cash transfers to combat 




Components of Red Solidaria 
Component 1 
Family Solidarity Network 
Component 2 
Network of Basic Services 
Component 3 
Family Sustainability Network 
Cash transfer targeted to families 
with pregnant women and children 
under 15 years old who have not 
finished 6
th grade, conditional on 
basic health care activities and 
school attendance. It also includes 
lifelong learning sessions for 
beneficiary families. 
Supply-side programmes in 
education (Effective Schools 
Network), health and nutrition 
(Extension of Health Services), and 
improvements and rehabilitation of 
basic and strategic infrastructure 
(drinking water, sanitation, 
electricity and rural roads). 
Promotion of productive projects 
and micro-credit schemes in the 
targeted municipalities. 
Source: Red Solidaria, 2006. 
 
The programme’s conceptual design took place between 2004 and the beginning of 2005 
and the Red was officially launched by a presidential decree in March 2005.2 This legal 
document lays the foundations of Red Solidaria, in terms of objectives, duration, assigned 
resources and institutional coordination. It states that the programme’s objective is to assist 
extremely poor families through short-term improvements in: (1) child and maternal health 
and nutrition; (2) basic education; and (3) drinking water, sanitation supply, electricity and 
roads to the poorest rural communities of the country. The programme’s components are 
described as tools to broaden the opportunities of the disadvantaged population in order  
to improve their economic and social condition.  
The programme’s duration coincides with the presidential term and the coverage goals 
are the 100 poorest municipalities, as identified by the national poverty map (presented in 
Appendix B). Resources for all three components are estimated to be approximately US$ 50 
million per year. The Social Investment Fund for Local Development (FISDL) is appointed as the 
implementing agency of the Red, but the programme’s technical and political coordination is 
placed under the Technical Secretariat of the Presidency and a Directive Council involving 
several government organizations. 
The focus on human capital investments was clearly highlighted in Red Solidaria from its 
inception. Thus, although immediate income protection rests at its core, the programme’s 
logical framework describes the Red’s overarching goal as the “reduction of the 
intergenerational transmission of poverty in El Salvador”, and this is linked to the achievement 
of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by 2015.3  
The purpose is the medium- and long-term improvement of the living conditions of 
extremely poor rural families through integrated interventions that give priority to the poorest 
municipalities. No income indicator is used to assess the achievement of this goal. Instead, the 
programme’s logical framework uses increases in enrolment, school attainment and 
immunizations, combined with decreases in child malnutrition and the prevalence of 
diarrhoea as its core indicators. This illustrates the importance given to human capital in 
advancing towards the Red’s overall goal.  
The rural emphasis of the programme is another of its distinctive features. The rationale  
for this emphasis is related to the poverty profile of El Salvador, which documents the 4  Country Study  nº 9 
 
disproportionately disadvantaged situation of the rural population, not only in terms of 
income poverty but also in terms of access to health, education, other basic services and 
infrastructure (World Bank, 2005; PNUD, 2003). Although poverty was significantly reduced 
between 1991 and 2002, the conditions in rural areas have remained critical. 
According to World Bank estimates, the national poverty headcount fell from 64 per cent 
to 37 per cent, and extreme poverty fell from 31 per cent to 15 per cent during 1991-2003. But 
50 per cent of rural Salvadorans still remained below the poverty line in 2002 and 24.5 per cent 
were extremely poor. In urban areas these figures were 28.5 per cent and nine per cent 
respectively.4 Similarly, while basic education enrolment rates were close to 90 per cent in 
urban areas, they were only 80 per cent in rural areas. Differentials in access to safe water, 
adequate sanitation and electricity were even more striking.5 
The design of the Red’s CCT and infrastructure components follows from the 
recommendations emerging from this poverty assessment and a previous social safety net 
assessment, also sponsored by the World Bank. The latter had identified more than 50 safety 
net-like programmes operating in the country, most of them small-scale or pilot projects, often 
uncoordinated and overlapping (World Bank, 2005).  
These reports highlighted the need for crafting an integrated social strategy focusing on: 
a) strengthening human capital, mostly through increasing education levels and providing 
access to basic health services to all; b) strengthening people’s access to markets and services 
by improving the supply of drinking water, sanitation services and roads in rural communities; 
and c) assisting and protecting the poorest and most vulnerable population, by means of a 
coherent, coordinated and well-targeted social safety net. 
3  DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION  
The cash transfers provided by Red Solidaria comprise a health stipend for families with pregnant 
women and children under 5 years old and an education stipend for families with children from 
5 to 15 years old who have not completed 6th grade, the second cycle of basic education. Each 
stipend is worth US$ 15 per month per family, but a family cap applies to those entitled to both, 
i.e., US$ 10 per month for each, totalling a maximum of US$ 20 per family.  
There are no variations in the amount of the transfers according to the size of the family  
or by the age, grade or gender of beneficiary children. The flat stipend per family might be 
grounded on a theoretical rationale related to economies of scale in household consumption. 
Additionally, since the stipend favours smaller families, it might indicate a concern regarding 
fertility incentives (Handa and Davis, 2006).  
The programme does not seem, however, to take into account direct and indirect 
costs involved in complying with its conditionalities—such as costs for school material  
and transportation and the opportunity costs of women and children involved in the 
programme. Nor does it take into account variable time and transportation costs incurred 
by recipients to collect the transfers. These depend on the distance of households from  
the place where payment takes place, with greater disadvantages for the more remote 
(and often poorer) communities.  International Poverty Centre  5 
 
 
3.1  THE SIZE OF TRANSFERS 
The criteria that informed the benefit size of Red Solidaria are not documented. Interviews with 
programme designers indicated that the decision on benefit values took into account the 
value of rural minimum wages, as well as the international experience with CCTs. Red’s 
transfers are supposed to represent around one quarter of the nominal minimum wage  
in agricultural activities, set at US$ 74.1 per month in 2004 (Funde, 2005). It should also be 
noted that CCTs should try to balance the priority of alleviating poverty in the short run with 
promoting the longer-term objective of investments in human capital—while, at the same 
time, avoiding the encouragement of dependency on transfers (Cohen and Franco, 2006).  
Nonetheless, the extent to which most CCTs have actually taken such calculations  
of values into account in their design is not clear, as budget constraints and political 
considerations related to setting the maximum number of beneficiaries are also intervening 
factors. In any case, Handa and Davis (2006) argue that an international rule of thumb is that,  
in order to be meaningful for beneficiaries, a poverty-related cash transfer should represent 
20-40 per cent of the per capita poverty line. Considering El Salvador’s official poverty line for 
rural areas, Red’s health and education stipends would lie within that range (37 per cent), while 
the combined stipends would even exceed it (50 per cent).6   
As with most CCTs implemented elsewhere, Red Solidaria addresses its transfers 
primarily to the mother or another female family member who is in charge of children’s care.7 
But the programme also includes a co-responsible beneficiary, usually the partner of the main 
female beneficiary or another person appointed by the family, who can withdraw the transfers 
in case the main beneficiary does not have her own identity card (a requirement to actually 
collect the stipend) or cannot be there in person during payment events.  
In order to minimize the occurrence of beneficiaries without formal identification, and  
to increase their access to this basic right of citizenship, the programme also includes plans to 
coordinate efforts with the government agency responsible for the provision of the national 
identity card. 
3.2  PAYMENT EVENTS 
The implementation of Red Solidaria, in particular its CCT component, has been a phased  
one. The first transfers took place in October 2005, with 15 municipalities included in the 
programme in that year, totalling 13,278 beneficiary families. In 2006, 17 additional 
municipalities and 10,828 families were included. This completed coverage of the first group of 
32 municipalities characterized by very high extreme poverty, determined by the poverty map. 
In 2007, the programme intends to reach another 15 municipalities, covering around 45,000 
families in total. By 2009, the goal of the programme is to reach 100,000 families in the 100 
targeted municipalities. 
Transfers are delivered bi-monthly in payment events that usually take place in the 
downtown area of the municipality and might occupy the whole morning, depending on  
the number of beneficiaries in each specific municipality. The operation of the transfers is 
contracted out to a banking institution, which organizes the logistics of the payments, 
including the transport of the money, security and cashiers. In contrast to the experience of 
other countries that rely on a fairly developed and widespread banking network, which allows 
an automated scheme for the delivery of CCTs through money teller machines and magnetic 6  Country Study  nº 9 
 
cards, Red’s transfers are handled manually and involve the displacement of considerable 
amounts of money and personnel across the country. 
The Red’s local coordination has an important role in the organization of payment 
events. An entire payment schedule is set up and beneficiaries are lined up according to  
this schedule and their exact placement in the transfer spreadsheet. This aims at 
rationalizing the process, shortening the time beneficiaries have to queue to receive their 
transfers. Nonetheless, there can be significant costs in terms of time and transportation  
for beneficiaries to attend the payment event. This strengthens the case for maintaining  
the Red’s bi-monthly delivery scheme.8 
4  CO-RESPONSIBILITIES 
As a CCT, Red Solidaria involves conditionalities that are usually associated with such transfers. 
These conditionalities are promoted as ‘co-responsibilities’, a term that implies a stronger role 
of beneficiaries in promoting their own well-being. Molineux (2006) points out that, together 
with the principles of participation and empowerment, the idea of co-responsibility or self-
help is central to the so-called New Poverty Agenda that has come to dominate development 
discourse in the 1990s. In Latin America, in general, these principles have found fertile ground, 
as the region has undergone public sector reforms originating from fiscal crises and 
widespread distrust of the State.  
Britto (2005), as well as Handa and Davis (2006), stresses political economy issues 
associated with the introduction of conditionalities in the cash transfer model that has been 
disseminated in the region. These have required the poor to ‘work’ for their money, focusing 
on promoting children’s human capital and supposedly empowering beneficiaries to do 
without state support in the future. The assumption is that such features would make these 
programmes more acceptable to taxpayers and voters. 
However, the idea of co-responsibility involves the notion of reciprocity, namely, the 
notion that obligations apply not only to recipients but also to the programme and service 
providers. In the case of Red Solidaria, co-responsibilities are detailed in a family agreement 
(convenio) that has to be signed by the main beneficiary and the family co-responsible if,  
once selected, the family agrees to take part in the programme. In accordance with this 
reciprocal notion, the agreement includes co-responsibilities for the beneficiary family  
as well as the government of El Salvador (see Box 2). 
The agreement also includes an explicit provision that the administration of the cash 
provided by the programme will be placed in the hands of the main beneficiary and an oath 
that all the information provided by the family for their inclusion in the programme is true. If 
the information is proved false, the oath would authorize immediate withdrawal of the family  
from the programme.  
On the government side, the agreement expresses the conditions under which the 
transfer shall be suspended. In the case of the education stipend, suspension occurs if any 
beneficiary children have at least four unjustified absences from school in a month.9 In the case 
of the health stipend, suspension occurs if the family a) does not attend a scheduled health 
check-up and does not comply with the immunizations protocol once or b) does not either 




Red Solidaria’s co-responsibilities  
For the beneficiary families  For the government of El Salvador 
Ensure school enrolment and attendance of their 
5-14 year olds, from pre-school to 6
th grade. 
Through the Ministry of Education, provide basic 
education up to 6
th grade to beneficiary children 
between the ages of 5 and 14 years. 
Register the family in health programmes, attend 
the child and maternal health check-ups and 
ensure compliance with the basic child and 
maternal health protocols and immunizations. 
Through the Ministry of Health, provide basic 
health services in health units or other institutions 
subcontracted for such purposes. 
Attend the family training sessions offered by  
Red Solidaria. 
Promote lifelong learning sessions for beneficiary 
families. 
Use the transfers provided by Red Solidaria on 
food consumption. 
Deliver the cash transfer, conditional on school 
enrolment and regular attendance of the 
beneficiary children (education stipend) and on the 
periodical child and maternal health check-ups and 
immunizations for children under 5 years old. 
Source: Family agreement. 
 
Thus, the actual conditionalities for the delivery of the transfers encompass the  
usual engagement in maternal and child preventive health activities and basic education 
enrolment and attendance for school-aged children that is instituted by most CCTs across 
Latin America. Nevertheless, the family agreement goes beyond those conditionalities when 
it sets up co-responsibilities related to the use of the transfers and the participation in 
lifelong learning sessions.  
4.1  WHAT IS A CONDITIONALITY? 
In practtice, the commitment to use the cash transfers on food is not monitored by the 
programme. As a matter of fact, the information material handed to beneficiaries when they 
sign the agreement stresses that the cash transfers should be used for food and for ensuring 
that children dedicate more time to their studies. Programme managers at the national level 
not only seemed unfamiliar with this requirement, but also judged it as an undesirable and 
excessively restrictive one.  
At the grassroots level, the perceptions of most programme managers and implementers 
were that transfers should be used for the benefit of the children, be this for food consumption, 
school materials, clothing, medicines or other basic needs of the family. Furthermore, this is 
the message that seems to be passed on to beneficiaries, and is in line with the rationale of 
achieving efficiency and well-being gains through expenditure decisions made by the mothers 
themselves. 
In contrast, participation in the programme’s lifelong training sessions is indeed verified. 
These sessions are conducted by NGOs for family support and follow-up. These organizations 
are contracted by the Red’s implementing agency and are involved in many other important 
aspects of the programme’s implementation in the field, including monitoring and control  
of co-responsibilities. Even though not participating in these sessions would not entail  
a suspension of the cash transfers, attendance is officially monitored by the local NGO 8  Country Study  nº 9 
 
promoters. Most beneficiaries are unaware that this co-responsibility actually does not  
have any effect on the cash benefit.  
In any case, training sessions are intended to be useful and empowering for beneficiary 
families—especially for women, who usually have experienced very few opportunities for 
participating in organized activities outside the domestic sphere. Besides being an instrument 
for clarifying the Red’s functioning, the monthly workshops encompass capacity-building on 
issues such as children’s rights; gender equity; hygiene, nutrition and safe handling of food; 
domestic violence; the importance of formal education for children; reproductive health; child 
labour; community participation and organization; and MDGs. In informal conversations held 
with beneficiaries during field visits, training sessions were frequently noted as an important 
and useful aspect of the programme. 
Until recently, however, there had been no unified training protocol followed by the 
NGOs that work with beneficiary families. They would carry out training sessions and develop 
the suggested topics according to their own previous experience in the field. The Red’s 
implementing agency has now developed training modules for each of these themes, on  
the basis of a participatory methodology that can be applied to an audience with little formal 
education. It intends to distribute this material to all NGOs that take part in the programme. 
Capacity-building for the local promoters that conduct these training sessions is regarded by 
programme managers as an important side benefit of Red Solidaria, in the sense that most of the 
field personnel employed by the NGOs are young promoters recruited in their own community. 
4.2  THE RATIONALE FOR CONDITIONALITIES 
The central importance attributed to the programme’s co-responsibilities emerges clearly in 
the discourse of programme managers. During interviews, stakeholders involved in managing 
Red Solidaria at national and local levels repeatedly expressed views that low achievements in 
education and health by the Salvadoran poor were related not only to supply failures of these 
services, but to a cultural tendency of undervaluing investments in human capital and relying 
excessively on remittances from abroad.  
This was the main justification given for the strong emphasis of the programme on the 
compliance with, and the verification of, its co-responsibilities, including those that were not 
automatically linked to the transfers, such as the participation in family training activities. 
Interestingly, the concern that cash transfers might generate beneficiary dependency seemed  
to be stronger with regard to increasing the co-responsibility of beneficiaries towards their own 
well-being than implementing strategies to graduate them from the programme. Issues of 
graduation have occupied the centre stage in the debate on many ‘older’ CCTs in Latin America.  
With regard to assessing results, Red Solidaria still has to undergo an external impact 
evaluation, in the form of a quasi-experiment planned to start in 2007 and include three 
subsequent rounds. For the time being, the available information on results comes from 
administrative records, which show considerable increases in school enrolments and child 
and maternal health check-ups.  
Comparing records from the first trimester of 2005 with those for the same period in 2006 
in the first 15 municipalities targeted by the programme, we see that enrolment increased by 
23 per cent in pre-school, six per cent in grades 1-3 and nine per cent in grades 3-6. Children’s International Poverty Centre  9 
 
 
health check-ups had experienced, in turn, an increase of 47 per cent and maternal health 
check-ups, 42 per cent (Red Solidaria, 2007).  
The impact evaluation might provide relevant information to assess these statistics  
and determine to what extent they are related to improvements in the supply of health and 
education services in the targeted municipalities or to the demand-side incentives created  
by the co-responsibilities of the programme. 
5  EXIT RULES 
In line with the conceptual and operational guidelines of Red’s legal framework and 
operational manual, the family agreement explicitly states its three-year duration. That means 
that each family would be entitled to receive the transfers for these three years only. This 
clause seemed very clear to most beneficiaries and all programme managers and stakeholders 
interviewed during the research fieldwork.  
What did not appear clear to them was what would happen afterwards: would the 
families simply stop receiving the transfer, regardless of the persistence of the eligibility 
conditions that had entitled them to be selected in the first place? Or would the programme 
have some kind of transition or phasing-out strategy that would eventually graduate families 
but avoid the interruption of the transfers in the middle of a school or immunization cycle?  
According to the Red’s operational manual, the exit strategy of the programme 
incorporates a re-evaluation of each family, which is undertaken after it receives the transfers 
for three years. This re-evaluation would take into account whether families still had children 
under five year olds (to continue to be eligible for the health stipend), or children between five 
and 15 years old who had not finished primary education, i.e., 6th grade (which would entitle 
them to continue receiving the education stipend). Nevertheless, the manual stresses that the 
questionnaire and the criteria to be used in this re-evaluation process are subject to validation 
by the inter-institutional Directive Council of Red Solidaria and to the availability of financial 
resources from the government of El Salvador (Red Solidaria, 2006). 
So far, the issue of programme graduation or mechanisms for re-certification of eligibility 
does not seem to be an important one for El Salvador’s CCT agenda. On the one hand, this 
might be due to the novelty of the programme, which is less than a year and a half old and still 
has not had to deal with this potentially difficult issue. On the other hand, it might be related 
to the Red’s central objective: to improve human capital, rather than merely reducing current 
income poverty.  
In this regard, the acceptable ‘exit door’ from the programme would seem to be a 
demographic one instead of an ‘emancipation’ strategy that would hypothetically be able  
to lift beneficiaries out of poverty—and that would be contingent upon many other factors 
related to the labour market and the economic performance of the country, as well as upon a 
synergistic coordination among different social programmes.11  
Most CCTs include, at least in principle, an explicit time limit after which families should 
be reassessed. The three-year period is a fairly common threshold.12 But the theoretical or 
empirical rationales—if any—that have governed the decisions with regard to these time 
limits are unclear (Cohen and Franco, 2006). They seem to be driven mostly by fiscal or political 10  Country Study  nº 9 
 
considerations, associated with fears that transfers might become financially unsustainable, be 
perceived as permanent entitlements and create dependency among beneficiaries. 
Some CCTs have, therefore, introduced transition rules, which include not only 
recertification strategies, but also declining stipends as a phasing-out mechanism. However, the 
variation across programme practices and discourses, as well as the difficulties associated with 
adopting a coherent and transparent exit strategy, have contributed to relegating graduation 
rules to the ‘unfinished agenda’ of CCTs in Latin America (de la Brière and Rawlings, 2006).  
A crucial issue in this respect is that graduation rules have to be shaped according to the 
programme’s central objective. From the perspective of human capital accumulation, which is 
the main objective stressed by Red Solidaria, short time limits—if strictly applied—might be 
counterproductive especially if they are not sufficient to cover the entire basic education or 
health cycle (Handa and Davis, 2006; Cohen and Franco, 2006; Soares and Ribas, forthcoming). 
6  TARGETING CRITERIA AND MECHANISMS 
Red Solidaria uses two criteria for targeting beneficiaries. First, there is geographical targeting, 
which is based on a poverty map developed by the Latin-American Faculty of Social Sciences 
(FLACSO), under FISDL supervision and with support from the World Bank and Inter-American 
Development Bank. This poverty map has identified the municipalities that are to be included 
in the programme. Second, there is household targeting, which selects families that are 
eligible to be programme beneficiaries in the targeted municipalities. 
The poverty map is based on an expansion of the yearly Multiple Purpose Household 
Survey (Encuesta de Hogares de Propositos Multiplos – EHPM), which has enabled the setting up 
of a unified database for the years 2001-2004 with data representative for the 262 Salvadoran 
municipalities. The map comprises two types of municipal classification: a cluster analysis that 
identifies four categories of extreme poverty and a within-cluster ranking of municipalities 
(FLACSO, 2005). 
The cluster analysis attempts to combine structural and current dimensions of poverty. 
In order to do so, it uses two variables: 1) the proportion of 1st grade students with severe 
height-for-age deficit (stunting); and 2) income poverty incidence (the poverty headcount). 
While the first indicator points to persistent deficits in consumption that result in the 
accumulated effect of malnutrition of children, the second one reflects a more immediate 
and fluctuating aspect of deprivation. Based on these indicators, municipalities were 
grouped into the following categories: 
•  Very high extreme poverty, comprising 32 municipalities; 
•  High extreme poverty, comprising 68 municipalities; 
•  Moderate extreme poverty, comprising 82 municipalities; 
•  Low extreme poverty, comprising 80 municipalities. 
 
The 100 municipalities that are characterized by very high extreme poverty and high 
extreme poverty were identified as the target of Red Solidaria. However, the phased 
implementation of the programme required some kind of ranking among municipalities International Poverty Centre  11 
 
 
included within the same cluster. For this purpose, the poverty map estimates an Integrated 
Index of Municipal Marginality (IIMM), which has a multidimensional approach to poverty.  
The IIMM combines and weights the monetary aspects of deprivation, measured by the 
income poverty gap of each municipality, with indicators related to unsatisfied basic needs 
in housing and education. These latter include: lack of access to piped water; lack of access 
to sanitation and electricity; crowding; prevalence of earthen floors; illiteracy and low 
schooling rates.  
The sequenced inclusion of each targeted municipality in Red Solidaria has carefully 
respected the poverty map ranking, rather than being guided by supply constraints or political 
considerations. The first 32 municipalities classified under the category of very high extreme 
poverty were the first to be included, according to their IIMM position. In 2007, the programme  
is expanding its reach towards the second cluster of 68 municipalities characterized by high 
extreme poverty, also following the IIMM ranking.  
6.1 CATEGORICAL TARGETING 
For household targeting, different criteria have been applied. In the rural areas of the 32 
municipalities that belong to the first cluster (very high extreme poverty), every family with 
pregnant women and children under 15 years old who have not finished 6th grade has been 
selected as a potential beneficiary. In urban areas, besides this demographic criterion, the 
following parameters have been included: housing conditions (material used on roof, walls 
and floor), crowding and access to sanitation.13  
The rationale underpinning categorical targeting is the pervasiveness of poverty in these 
municipalities, particularly in rural areas.14 More focused household targeting in this context 
would mean unjustifiable administrative costs and, hypothetically, could lead to social 
tensions within small, isolated communities, as reported in the first evaluations of the Mexican 
pioneer CCT (Adato et al., 2000). Categorical targeting has the additional advantage of using 
very transparent and straightforward eligibility criteria, a feature that might be lost with the 
use of multidimensional indices of well-being or complex and secretive formulas for 
estimating household income through proxy means tests (PMT).  
Based on recent evaluation reports on the Nicaraguan and Mexican CCTs, Handa and 
Davis (2006) stress, however, the difficulties of maintaining a categorical approach as the 
programme expands towards better-off communities and requires more accurate mechanisms  
to identify the poorest. In this sense, for the 68 municipalities belonging to the second cluster, 
the Red’s operational manual details a proxy means text that would combine variables related 
to the household’s location (rural or urban), housing conditions, possession of durable goods, 
family composition and characteristics, and access to remittances from abroad.  
During fieldwork, however, there appeared to be some uncertainty regarding the use  
of the PMT, at least based on its original formula. Further studies to test its validity and 
applicability were to be carried out on FISDL’s databases before a final decision was to be 
taken on how to tackle household targeting in those municipalities.15  
6.2  HOUSEHOLD CENSUS 
The mechanism that underpins the process of household targeting is a household census 
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municipality, after a detailed cartographic study is used to identify and locate all households  
in that municipality.  
Cartographic studies are contracted out to NGOs or private institutions, whose work is 
closely supervised by FISDL. There is a strong component of local participation in this process, 
as representatives of the municipality and community leaders are closely involved in the initial 
identification of the population of the different rural districts and communities of that area 
(cantones and caseríos), as well as in the validation of the draft maps produced. Also, except for 
the fieldwork supervisor, all cartographers must be recruited at the municipality level and 
receive specific training for their work. 
The cartographic study maps all geographical landmarks and physical infrastructure 
found in the municipality with GPS equipment. Its final products are detailed maps that 
encompass urban and rural areas and provide information at the level of small rural 
communities, as well as a directory of households by community.  
Besides being used by FISDL as an input for the census of potential beneficiaries, the 
maps are handed back to the local level through the Red’s municipal committee. As such, they 
may be used for the planning and implementation of other public policies and investments in 
the municipality.16 
Using the cartographic study, a thorough household census is carried out in each 
municipality to be included in the Red. The census covers both rural and urban areas and 
uses a detailed questionnaire on housing conditions, socio-demographic characteristics of all 
household members, working activities of household members older than 10 years, as well 
as other general household information. It also includes a declaration of the respondent that 
all the information given is true and that the government is authorized to use it in directing 
social policies.  
It seems that a substantial portion of the information captured by the questionnaire is not 
used by the system that screens potential beneficiaries on the basis of the census database. 
Some of the questions are related to the formula for proxy means testing, but others are not 
even related to that aspect. Thus, the reasons for their inclusion in the questionnaire are 
unclear. Some of them could be important inputs for other government programmes, if the 
census database were shared with different organizations—a development that has not 
happened so far. For instance, in the case of children who are not attending school, the 
questionnaire collects information on the reasons. This could be a strategic guide for the 
interventions of the Ministry of Education.  
Another example is information related to indigenous ancestry. Most of the programme 
managers credit the inclusion of this aspect to the international donors involved in the design 
of the programme, and not to a specific issue or concern of the programme itself or even the 
government of El Salvador.17  
The census process was originally contracted out. Due to problems of data quality, it has 
now been completely undertaken by the Social Investment Fund for Local Development 
(FISDL), which directly hires, trains and supervises the researchers and the data-entry 
personnel. This requires considerable field-work, for which FISDL has made significant 
investments, including the purchase of equipment and vehicles. International Poverty Centre  13 
 
 
Once the census is completed and the data are entered in the database, a list of potential 
beneficiaries in every target municipality is created. It is in this stage that the verification of the 
additional parameters applied to urban families takes place, as urban potential beneficiaries 
are revisited by members of the Red’s municipal committee (usually FISDL’s local 
representative for that municipality or the municipal liaison to the programme).  
According to the programme managers, because of Red’s rural emphasis, the proportion 
of urban beneficiaries has been kept low. Nevertheless, it seems that there would be no need 
for revisiting these families since the additional parameters could all be derived from census 
data. It is possible that some other discretionary parameters have been applied during these 
visits, but further evidence would be needed to confirm or deny this hypothesis.18 
6.3  INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION ERRORS 
The actual list of eligible households by municipality is generated at the central level and the 
NGOs for family support and follow-up promote incorporation events for the signing of the 
family agreement.  
There are no estimates of targeting errors available. According to the statistics of the 
poverty map, around 75 per cent of the households of the 32 municipalities of the first cluster 
are classified as poor or extremely poor, while the Red’s CCT component covers around 70 per 
cent of the households in these same municipalities. Thus, under-coverage is presumably low. 
Since the programme adopted categorical targeting in the rural areas of these 32 
municipalities, possible inclusion or exclusion errors would be identified mostly in urban areas 
due to the implementation of the special parameters applied, or would be related to failures in 
the cartographic studies or in the census process. However, it should be noted that the static 
nature of these processes (which are the only way to enter the programme) might end up also 
generating exclusion errors, due to the demographic dynamics of the households or family 
migration to targeted municipalities.  
Regarding inclusion errors, programme managers have pointed to queuing to collect the 
transfers as an additional self-targeting mechanism that is able to minimize leakage to the non-
poor. But the opposite argument could be made: transaction and opportunity costs incurred to 
collect the transfers could favour the inclusion of the better-off, who can afford such costs.  
Targeting errors might be aggravated with the use of the PMT to identify eligible 
beneficiaries in the municipalities from the second cluster. Further analyses of the census 
database would be required to examine this issue in detail.19 Nevertheless, international 
experience indicates that targeting accuracy is much more an issue of implementing capacity, 
institutional arrangements and monitoring and oversight mechanisms than an inherent 
characteristic of specific targeting methods (Coady et al 2004; Castañeda et al 2005).  
7  INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND IMPLEMENTING CAPACITY 
At the national level, Red Solidaria comprises the following institutional structure. The political 
coordination of the programme falls under the Presidency, through the coordination of the 
social cabinet by the Technical Secretariat. Additionally, there is the Directive Council of the 
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at ministerial level (including the Minister of Finance). This Council is supposed to meet twice a 
month and has the role of ensuring the strategic coordination required for the implementation 
of the Red as well as of other policies directed towards extreme poverty in El Salvador. 
The technical coordination of the programme is charged to an Executive Directorate, 
which works in close coordination with the Social Investment Fund for Local Development 
(FISDL), the Red’s implementing agency. The Executive Directorate has a very slim structure 
(currently, four employees plus the Director) and is hierarchically linked to the Presidency, 
although physically located at FISDL headquarters. The inter-institutional coordination 
required at the technical level takes place at an Intersectoral Committee, where the 
organizations represented in the Directive Council have a seat. 
The rationale for these inter-institutional structures is related not only to the integrated 
approach of a CCT programme, which combines cash transfers with co-responsibilities in 
health and education, but also to the other components of the Red that deal with 
infrastructure investments, productive projects and micro-credit schemes.  
FISDL coordinates and supervises the programme’s operations. It is the successor of the 
original Social Investment Fund (FIS), created in the early 1990s with the same characteristics 
as the social fund model that prevailed in the Latin American development agenda of that 
time: a temporary mandate, a focus on infrastructure projects, a demand-based orientation 
and a heavy reliance on external resources.  
During the 1990s, the Fund achieved permanent status and underwent several 
transformations. Since 1997, its mission has been the “eradication of poverty in El Salvador” 
and its mandate has included a strong component of local development and coordination 
with municipal governments. FISDL’s history, mandate and nation-wide network, through its 
44 local representatives, made it a logical choice as the implementing agency of Red Solidaria, 
which is now its biggest and most important programme. 
7.1  LOCAL COORDINATORS 
The implementation of Red Solidaria is coordinated by FISDL’s local representatives in charge 
of the targeted municipalities,20 who work closely with two other key actors: the municipal 
liaison to the programme and the NGO for family support and follow-up.  
Municipalities get formally involved in the Red through signing an agreement between 
the mayor and FISDL, which includes the commitment to support the Red’s local activities and 
the appointment of a municipal liaison for the programme. This latter representative is usually 
the mayor himself or another employee or elected representative appointed by the mayor for 
this task. As is the case with the FISDL local representative, the municipal liaison’s involvement 
with the Red covers its three components and is an add-on function, for which there is no 
specific remuneration or incentive.  
The NGOs for family support and follow-up are hired annually by FISDL through a bidding 
process for the implementation of the CCT component in each municipality. During the 
research fieldwork, there were five NGOs working with the first 32 municipalities included in 
the programme and the bidding by NGOs that would work with the 15 municipalities to enter 
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The NGOs have a regional coordinator, a municipal coordinator and a team of local 
promoters, usually young leaders recruited in the municipality, who are each responsible for 
working with 150-160 families. In practice, they are the main link between beneficiaries and 
the programme.  
As described above, the NGOs are in charge of the bulk of the programme’s local 
activities, including: organizing events for the signing of family agreements; monitoring and 
reporting of the compliance with co-responsibilities; conducting lifelong learning sessions 
for beneficiary families; coordinating (along with the FISDL local representative) payment 
events; receiving complaints; and administering and updating the information that feeds 
into the beneficiary registry system. Most of this work requires frequent visits to beneficiary 
households, but local promoters interviewed during the research pointed out the difficulties 
in reaching the remotest communities—especially since most of them have to reach these 
destinations on foot.  
These three key stakeholders (FISDL local representatives, municipal liaisons and NGOs for 
family support and follow-up) are the core of the municipal committees of the programme, 
which also include representatives from the health and education sectors (usually the director 
of the health unit in the municipality and an employee of the departmental office of the 
Ministry  
of Education), as well as community leaders and, in some cases, representatives of other 
government agencies working with the Red in that particular town (e.g., Ministry of Agriculture 
and National Registry Agency). The FISDL local representative is responsible for the 
coordination of the committee and its regular meetings, which should take place monthly.  
The municipal committee’s main role is the inter-institutional coordination at the local 
level for the implementation of the Red’s three components. A substantial portion of its 
mandate is related to the infrastructure component through the selection and oversight of 
construction and rehabilitation projects.  
In the CCT component the committee’s activities include: validation of the cartographic 
study; follow-up and validation of the census of potential beneficiaries; validation of urban 
families that comply with the special targeting parameters; and monitoring of updates and 
exclusions with regard to the list of beneficiaries that are proposed by the NGO for family 
support and follow-up. Social monitoring and transparency are thus one of the objectives of 
the municipal committees since they can assess the exclusions of beneficiaries proposed by 
the NGOs, function as a channel for complaints from beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries and 
provide an alternative channel to the NGOs. 
7.2  STRENGTHENING LOCAL PARTICIPATION 
Intended or unintended attempts to forge new accountability relationships between central 
and local governments, as well as between service providers and beneficiaries are frequently 
present in CCT programmes (de la Brière and Rawlings, 2006). Local instances of participation 
are usually included in the programmes’ strategy to foster community participation or civil 
society engagement that contributes to greater transparency and efficiency. The reason is that 
they can combine functions of direct accountability (as social control mechanisms) and voice  
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Nonetheless, the extent to which they are effectively put in place varies according to  
the degree of decentralization experienced in implementation, as well as being dependent  
on institutional settings and contextual factors related to local governance and politics. 
Furthermore, depending on how they are formed and function, their performance can be 
limited to merely legitimizing decisions taken elsewhere. 
In Red Solidaria, there are shortcomings in the functioning of municipal committees. 
Although they have been officially set up in the 47 municipalities that the Red is expected to 
cover by the end of 2007, their work has not been homogeneous. It depends heavily on the 
engagement of its members, particularly the FISDL local representative, who makes sure that 
the committee meets regularly and coordinates its meetings. Some of the committees’ roles, 
such as the validation of urban families as beneficiaries, have been taken over by a few of their 
members, such as the FISDL representative and the municipal liaison.  
One bottleneck seems to be the lack of participation of community leaders, who receive 
no direct incentives to attend the meetings, having to cover long distances, usually on foot, 
and lose a day’s work to be present. And it is not clear the extent to which the community 
leaders included in the committees indeed represent beneficiaries. A common feature of these 
leaders is that most of them are males, an outcome that might indicate the prevalence of a 
cultural gender bias in their choice.  
Besides the municipal committee, the Red’s local institutional design involves a beneficiary 
or community committee, which should comprise at least three beneficiaries in each district 
(canton), who function as liaisons between the community and the NGO for family support and 
follow-up. It seems, however, that they have not been set up in most communities. Throughout 
the field research, it was not possible to find evidence related to their work. 
It should be noted that programme managers are aware of these shortcomings and have 
developed a detailed operational guide for the functioning of municipal committees, as well as 
a monitoring system that includes in-person oversight of committee meetings and a digital 
platform for a virtual follow-up of their activities. The dissemination of this guide and the 
implementation of the monitoring system have begun in 2007. 
In any case, the vertical organizational structure of the programme, which relies on a top-
down approach from the Social Investment Fund for Local Development (FISDL), might create 
additional challenges for the programme’s expansion, since it bears the potential of creating 
conflict, particularly in municipalities that are not governed by ARENA. 
8  INTERSECTORAL COORDINATION  
Red Solidaria was launched as part of the government’s social strategy called Oportunidades. 
This strategy is described as an effort to develop people’s capabilities and opportunities for 
social and economic inclusion in El Salvador. Besides Red Solidaria, targeted at the poorest 
rural population, this strategy comprises four other strategic areas: health (Fosalud), youth 
(Jóvenes), information technology (Conéctate) and credit (Tu Credito).  
The way that these five programmes interconnect is, however, not self-evident. 
Apparently, there is no direct coordination between them, with the exception of the micro-
credit projects that form part of the Red’s component of family sustainability. The five 
components seem to have been grouped together more because of the presidential priority 
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Nevertheless, one can argue that Red Solidaria does achieve an important intersectoral 
coordination with education and health, particularly at the national level. The Ministries  
of Health and Education have taken part in the programme since its design, including  
the formulation of the logical framework, the definition of co-responsibilities and the  
follow-up mechanisms.  
In the implementation phase, these ministers are important partners in the supply-side 
efforts that have to be linked with a CCT-like programme, through the programmes ‘Extension 
of Health Services’ (ESS) and ‘Effective Schools Networks’ (REE), which are targeted at the same 
municipalities reached by the Red.21 The ministries are also involved in the impact evaluation 
planned to start in 2007. This coordination takes place not only at the political level, through the 
Red’s Directive Council, but also at the technical level, through the Intersectoral Committee.  
Moreover, the Red goes beyond simply establishing add-on responsibilities for the health 
and education personnel associated with its CCT component. It directs additional resources for 
strengthening education and health infrastructure through its second component. Thus, the 
Red has not led only to an additional burden or a reorientation of line ministries’ funds for 
these areas. It has also meant an infusion of ‘new money’ and potentially greater impacts for 
the ministries’ own programmes. 
At the municipal level, the coordination of health and education providers with Red 
Solidaria is related mostly to feeding the information flow needed for the verification of  
co-responsibilities that are monitored by the NGOs for family support and follow-up. 
Interviews with the service providers visited during the research fieldwork indicated that  
the degree of familiarity with the programme appeared higher among health personnel than 
education officers. This could be related to the fact that the director of the municipal health 
unit has a seat on the municipal committee, while the education representative comes from 
the departmental level.  
Even with a fair degree of intersectoral coordination and an integrated design, there  
have been supply-side constraints on the programme. For instance, newspaper articles have 
pointed out that the beginning of the school year after the Red was introduced in the first  
15 targeted municipalities was marked by shortages of classrooms, equipment and teachers 
needed to respond to the increases in enrolment resulting from the programme. Officials of 
the Ministry of Education confirmed these difficulties, but pointed out they are commonly 
observed in many urban schools of the country.  
The Red’s novelty was that it focused on poor and remote rural areas, often ‘invisible’ to 
regular social programmes—and that a greater speed in government response was required 
so as to avoid jeopardizing the programme’s co-responsibilities, which have been a highly 
valued aspect of the Red. In this sense, incentives that increase the demand for social services, 
especially when they are linked to such a visible programme as Red Solidaria, might work as 
positive pressures for the expansion of service coverage and motivate the population to access 
basic rights to which they are entitled.   
8.1  DIRECT AND INDIRECT COSTS 
An important issue, which does not appear as a specific education sector programme but is 
clearly linked to the Red’s success, is school transportation. As most of the Red’s beneficiaries 
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adequate condition, school distance can be an obstacle for children’s attendance. 
Apparently, each school network incorporated into the REE programme could use part of  
its money to set up transportation schemes. However, there is no national programme that 
addresses this potential supply-side constraint and REE funds might not be sufficient to 
provide an appropriate solution. 
In the health sector, increases in demand resulting from Red Solidaria have also required 
hiring more doctors and nurses and finding other ‘creative’ approaches, such as directing to 
the Red-covered municipalities medical students that are fulfilling their one-year social service 
requirements. What remains to be further investigated is whether these responses address 
only the immediate objective of ensuring that beneficiaries comply with the programme’s  
co-responsibilities but do not offer them quality services in education and health that go 
beyond meeting the formal requirements.  
Quality of service provision is an issue of concern pointed out by many analysts who have 
examined supply-side constraints that might jeopardize the long-term effectiveness of CCTs 
(Britto, 2005; Handa and Davis, 2006; Cohen and Franco, 2006; de la Brière and Rawlings, 2006). 
In the case of education and health in El Salvador, the World Bank-led poverty assessment 
provides some interesting findings (World Bank, 2005). For instance, reasons mentioned by 
poor families for having children out of school related to access and affordability issues 
associated with direct and indirect costs of schooling, in addition to a lack of interest in 
school in some cases. This might reflect low perceived returns to education associated with 
problems of educational quality. But a general lack of availability of schools was not widely 
reported (although this might be a problem in some circumstances, such as secondary 
schooling in rural areas).  
In health, there is an affordability problem related to the practice of charging user fees in 
health centres—although they had been legally abolished in 2002. Furthermore, despite the 
main focus of the Red’s health co-responsibility on primary health care, which is an important 
issue for poor families, there is an urgent need to go beyond preventive measures to broaden 
access to general health insurance. More than 80 per cent of the Salvadoran population is 
uninsured—a proportion that reaches over 97 per cent among the extremely poor. 
Besides health and education, the Red’s sustainability component encompasses another 
relevant requirement of intersectoral coordination. This component’s productive projects are 
implemented by the Ministry of Agriculture (MAG), and its micro-credit schemes are under the 
responsibility of the Multi-Sectoral Investments Bank (BMI). Although these initiatives might 
coincide, in terms of geographical targeting, with the CCT component, their beneficiaries are 
not necessarily the same households that receive the cash transfers due to differing eligibility 
requirements and targeting criteria.  
Furthermore, the productive component of the Red lacks adequate resources: it has relied 
mostly on budget re-orientation towards the targeted municipalities rather than the provision 
of ‘new money’. The reason might be related to the weak emphasis on promoting ‘exit doors’ 
for the CCT component that are not demographically based. Another possibility, mentioned 
during an interview, is that transferring cash or building infrastructure is more visible and less 
complex than promoting time-intensive productive projects that can be capable of positive 
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9  PROGRAMME COSTS, POLITICAL SUPPORT AND SUSTAINABILITY 
We could not obtain detailed information on the disaggregated budget and costs of  
Red Solidaria. When the programme was created, estimates projected costs of around US$ 50 
million per year, covering its three components. This amount is mentioned not only in the 
conceptual document, but also in the legal framework of the programme. Managers have 
pointed out that this estimate has been maintained on average, although there have been 
annual variations related to phased implementation, fine-tuning and adjustments, as well as 
upfront fixed costs incurred in the design and setting-up of operations, such as the purchase  
of equipment and vehicles for fieldwork.  
According to programme managers, the CCT component comprises around 20 per cent  
of the Red’s total budget, but it is not clear how much is spent on transfers and how much is 
absorbed by the administrative costs involved in targeting mechanisms, delivery of transfers and 
programme administration. These costs comprise FISDL expenditures and the costs incurred 
with the NGOs for family support and follow-up. Up until now, the sustainability component has 
absorbed only a small portion of the Red’s budget: less than US$ 1 million annually. As a result, 
the bulk of the programme’s resources are addressed to the infrastructure component. 
A remarkable feature of the programme is that transfers are completely financed through 
national funds. As much as Red Solidaria depends heavily on external resources, these have 
been directed to the infrastructure component and, to some extent, to the programme’s 
management. This might increase the prospects for the sustainability of the CCT component if 
one considers, in particular, that the political polarization of the country hindered the approval 
of foreign loans in the National Assembly. 
9.1  EXTERNAL FINANCING 
The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the World Bank have been important 
partners in Red’s conception and initial design and have negotiated loans amounting to  
US$ 57 million and US$ 21 million respectively, mostly to finance basic infrastructure and 
improvements of health supply in the programme’s targeted municipalities, as part of Red’s 
Component 2. Nevertheless, these loans faced strong objections from the opposition party 
and the deadlines for the beginning of their disbursement have not been met. Since these 
loans have not been approved in a timely manner, the government of El Salvador does not 
seem to be counting anymore on them. 
The programme was able to fill in this resource gap through international cooperation 
grants from the European Union (totalling 37 million euros), Luxembourg (20 million euros) 
and Spain (10 million euros). The German bilateral cooperation agency has also had an 
important role in financing capacity-building activities for the Red’s implementing agency. 
Thus, the non-approval of foreign loans for Red Solidaria does not seem to have jeopardized,  
so far, the programme’s continuity.   
In many interviews carried out at the grassroots level with beneficiaries, municipal 
personnel, and health and education personnel, widespread concerns about the continuity  
of the programme due to the non-approval of the loans were evident. In general, local 
stakeholders were not aware that the CCT component did not depend on external money  
and that foreign grants could fill in the gap created by the absence of the loans. In this sense, 
bottom-up pressures could have been used to increase the prospects of approval of the World 20  Country Study  nº 9 
 
Bank and IDB loans. However, the political polarization of the country and the long history of 
foreign dependence and external debt appear to have been prominent factors influencing 
congressmen’s deliberations.  
9.2  POLITICAL CHALLENGES 
Red Solidaria originates from a presidential initiative and relies heavily on this back-up. This 
gives the programme considerable support and commitment from top government officials 
and smoothes out implementing difficulties deriving from intra-governmental conflicts. 
Furthermore, it makes the programme highly visible to beneficiaries and to society  
as a whole. This strategy has been deliberately adopted by the government through 
considerable investments in publicity and the frequent association of the programme  
with the presidential image.  
This high programme profile also entails difficulties, however, in the sense that the close 
links with the president and the party in power make the programme a preferred target for  
the opposition. The difficulties in the approval of the loans for Red Solidaria illustrate this point.  
As could be expected, debates in the National Assembly about the loans have been politically 
motivated and have not centred on conceptual or design aspects of the programme itself, but 
rather on the allegedly propagandistic use of it, as well as the deepening of an already 
unsustainable foreign debt.  
Despite the political difficulties in the National Assembly, the solid design of Red Solidaria 
seems to have given it a considerable amount of technical legitimacy. Geographical targeting 
through the poverty map prevents discretionary politically-driven expansions. This is 
enhanced by the fact that the poverty map was developed by a reputed academic institution 
(FLACSO), with the objective of providing inputs to FISDL’s activities in general, not just the 
Red. Only after the map was ready was the Red created and based on it.  
Furthermore, in 2006 new municipal governments were elected and took office for a 
three-year term. This changed the political map of the country and required new terms of 
agreement between the national government and targeted municipalities for the Red’s 
implementation. Despite these problems, the poverty map continued to be respected in the 
programme’s expansion strategy. Now, of the 47 municipalities that will be part of the Red 
until the end of 2007, 26 are ruled by the president’s party (ARENA) and 12 by its main 
opposition party (FLMN), while the nine others are governed by smaller parties. 
The experience of other Latin American countries with CCTs served as an inspiration to 
Red Solidaria, a fact that has been used to strengthen its technical legitimacy. The conceptual 
document, the programme’s website and even the poverty map reports refer to successful 
CCTs implemented in Chile, Colombia and Mexico. They provide evidence of positive impacts 
of this kind of programme and justify its introduction in El Salvador. Moreover, consultants 
from some of these countries have been directly involved in Red’s initial design. 
The Red has also been able to attract strong donor support. In spite of the controversy 
regarding the approval of World Bank and IDB loans, the programme managed to raise 
substantial grant funding from bilateral donors and the European Union. These countries are 
highlighted as strategic partners of the Red in publicity material and on the programme’s 
website. This support is used as a kind of guarantee of Red’s sound technical quality. International Poverty Centre  21 
 
 
Another issue that seems to contribute to the programme’s political support and 
sustainability is the fact that, since the design stage, line ministries have been politically  
and technically involved with it. Not only is this important in ensuring that a demand-based 
incentive, such as a CCT, is coordinated with supply-side programmes; but it also helps avoid 
or overcome bureaucratic jealousy. 
In general, our impressions of the programme derived from interviews and informal talks 
with local stakeholders as well as newspapers articles were quite positive. Even though the 
limited scope of the research and the fieldwork did not allow a systematic presentation of 
evidence in this respect, the main criticisms of the programme have been confined to specific 
aspects, such as the size of the transfers (judged by some to be too small and insufficient to 
make real impacts on the lives of people), supply-side issues (which have not been adequately 
tackled) and a supposedly propagandistic use of Red Solidaria by the government.  
10  CONCLUSION: PENDING ISSUES AND REMAINING CHALLENGES 
Red Solidaria is an example of how a small country, with limited resources, can design and set 
up a complex CCT programme. It has drawn valuable lessons from previous CCT experiences 
elsewhere; counted on a technically strong and motivated team; received political 
championship from the top levels of government; set up inter-institutional mechanisms  
for administrative coordination; and drawn on technical and financial support form varied 
international sources.  
El Salvador’s specific features, especially its small size combined with an effective national 
institution with a widespread network and a mandate related to poverty reduction might have 
favoured the implementation strategy for Red Solidario. The programme has relied heavily on 
on-site supervision by FISDL personnel. 
Still, there are important issues and challenges related to the programme’s agenda, some 
of which are widely acknowledged by programme managers and identified as areas of 
attention in the near future. 
10.1  LOCAL PARTICIPATION 
First of all, there is a need to strengthen the mechanisms of local participation, in particular the 
participation of municipal committees and beneficiary committees. They are regarded as vital 
arenas for ensuring the legitimacy and publicity of the Red’s crucial activities, such as targeting 
and programme follow-up. Even though these committees have been fulfilling these roles, 
greater efforts are needed to genuinely involve and give voice to representatives of the 
beneficiaries themselves.  
Much of the work carried out by the committees is concentrated in the hands of local 
FISDL representatives and municipal coordinators from the NGOs for family support and 
follow-up. The former handle most of the strategic instruments and information related to  
the infrastructure component of the Red, while the latter handle practically all formal contacts 
between beneficiaries and the programme (including fielding complaints and investigating 
justifications for non-compliance with co-responsibilities).  22  Country Study  nº 9 
 
Capacity-building and incentives at the grassroots level might be as important as  
the monitoring approach adopted by the programme’s managers in broadening the  
scope of participation in these committees. It will be important to avoid both a 
concentration of discretionary powers in the hands of these representatives and the 
overburdening of beneficiaries and community leaders with additional tasks that have  
only modest practical impacts. 
A minor issue related to the institutional capacity of the programme relates to the 
prevailing human resource profile in FISDL. Since it has traditionally been an organization 
oriented towards infrastructure (and the size of the infrastructure component of the Red is 
quite large), most of FISDL’s personnel has a background in architecture, engineering or other 
such sciences. Certainly this need not be an obstacle that hinders their active and enthusiastic 
involvement in a CCT programme, but such a profile poses additional requirements in terms of 
training and capacity-building, especially for the local representatives who work at the 
grassroots level. 
An important challenge for the integrated approach of the programme concerns 
strengthening the links between the CCT component and the sustainability component.  
Even if the Red does not emphasize productive projects as the ‘exit door’ of the transfer 
programme—which seems to be an appropriate view—Component 3, which covers 
productive projects and micro-credit schemes, still receives very small funding compared  
to the other two components. What is more serious is that there are no concerted efforts to 
ensure that this component’s beneficiaries coincide with the CCT beneficiaries, presumably the 
poorest ones in the communities. 
10.2  PROGRAMME DURATION 
Some design issues regarding the CCT component also pose important problems. For instance, 
as the programme has an expected duration of three years for each beneficiary family, it does 
not cover the time needed for the human capital impacts intended by the Red. The whole 
monitoring system for children’s health and immunizations covers children up to the age of 
five years. This means that a beneficiary family with a pregnant woman would have to be in the 
programme for at least six years to have the entire maternal and child health protocol covered. 
In the case of education, limiting the programme’s grants to families with children who 
have not completed 6th grade not only contradicts the goal of ensuring at least basic education 
to all, but might also create negative incentives for grade promotion among students who do 
not have the relevant age for their grade. Without any problems of repetition or drop-out, 
students would reach 6th grade at the age of 12, not 15 years.  
Strengthening the delivery of basic education beyond 6th grade in the targeted 
municipalities is needed to remove this potential perverse incentive from the programme, 
since supply constraints have been pointed out as the main reason for the grade-related 
eligibility requirement. Dealing with the quality of education and providing more than just 
preventive health care for the poor are also important areas that need further attention. 
10.3  TARGETING CRITERIA 
With regard to accountability issues, there is a lack of transparency in the targeting criteria 
used by the PMT, whose actual formula still seems to be under discussion. On the one hand, International Poverty Centre  23 
 
 
the application of an econometric formula to the census data to determine eligibility is likely to 
make it more difficult for potential beneficiaries to enhance their chances of being included in 
the programme (if they are unaware of the scoring weights being used). On the other hand, it 
might generate perceptions of unfairness that cannot be easily addressed because the 
eligibility requirements are not easily understood.  
To some extent, these perceptions have already developed as a result of the application 
of the additional targeting parameters for urban areas. They might also worsen as the 
programme moves towards covering the broader population identified as the second  
cluster through the use of the poverty map.  
The same problem affects the co-responsibilities that might not be, in reality, 
conditionalities for receiving the cash transfers. Participation in family training sessions is 
frequently presented to beneficiaries as a conditionality, similar to school attendance and 
health check-ups. However, even though such sessions might be an important element of the 
CCT component, for the sake of transparency they should be presented as what they really are: 
co-responsibilities that do not entail discounts in the monthly grants. 
10.4  ENTRY DOORS 
Another area of concern relates to the static approach of the programme in the way that it 
identifies and includes beneficiaries. Since targeting is completely based on a census that takes 
place only once, it does not take into account poverty or demographic dynamics. The only 
continuous updating of the list of beneficiaries concerns cases of exclusion, which arise due 
either to the correction of previous inclusion errors or situations in which beneficiaries 
exceed the eligibility thresholds (e.g., children turning 16 years of age or finishing 6th grade).  
More dynamically based ‘entry doors’ to the programme, which are also carefully 
designed not to create fertility incentives, could be developed to address this limitation.  
But this would make sense only if the programme overcomes its temporary status, i.e., it is 
extended beyond the year 2009.  
In this sense, Red Solidaria would have to be institutionalized as a permanent programme 
and be complemented by other programmes that are part of a coherent social protection 
strategy. As much as the programme might achieve important impacts on the well being  
of poor rural households with children, many other vulnerable groups in El Salvador remain 
uncovered by any kind of social assistance or social insurance scheme.  
Thus, an integrated social protection strategy has to consider how to reach the urban 
poor, the elderly and the disabled, taking account of El Salvador’s specific context of pervasive 
informality in the labour market, serious fiscal constraints and political polarization. This is a 
challenge that would require designing various kinds of social programmes—a task that would 
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   Department  Municipality  Number of 





1  Morazan Torola  342  1,801  1 88.6  60.5 
2  San Miguel  San Antonio del 
Norte  1,126 6,373  1  78.1  59.5 
3  Sonsonate Cuisnahuat  2,356 12,854 1  76.1  52.4 
4  Morazan Guatajiagua  2,343 10,907 1  78.2  53.1 
5  Sonsonate Caluco  1,484 8,341  1  79.1  43.7 
6  Usulatan Nueva  Granada  1,604 8,307  1  84.4  58.9 
7  Chalatenango San  Fernando  529  2,819  1  81.9  59.7 
8  Cabanas Jutiapa  1,256  7,178  1  77.8  53.9 
9  Morazan Gualococti  580  3,090  1  80.3  56.6 
10  San Miguel  Carolina  2,011  10,215  1  67.9  45.6 
11  Morazan San  Isidro  649  3,543  1  73.7  49.8 
12  Cabanas Cinquera  255 1,184  1  83.1  52.6 
13  Chalatenango  San Jose 
Cancasque  421 1,915  1  81.2  58.0 
14  Morazan Joateca  838 4,176  1  74.0  43.2 
15  Ahuachapan Guaymango  3,921  19,832  1  72.7  47.2 
16  Chalatenango  San Isidro 
Labrador  83 376  1 75.9  59.0 
17  Chalatenango  San Francisco 
Morazan  518 2,718  1  77.2  47.9 
18  Morazan San  Simon  1,567  8,062  1  70.1  44.2 
19  Santa Ana  Masahut  801  4,113  1  77.8  48.2 
20  Chalatenango Arcato  590  2,895 1  72.0  48.3 
21  San Vicente  Santa Clara 897  4,632  1  73.8  47.8 
22  Chalatenango  San Antonio 
Ranchos  334 1,485  1  80.2  49.7 
23  San Vicente  San Esteban 
Catarina  906 4,598  1  75.7  43.1 
24  Usulatan San  Agustin  932  4,448 1  66.3  46.6 
25  Santa Ana  Santiago de la 
Frontera  1,539 6,589  1  68.2  44.6 
26  Sonsonate  Santo Domingo 
de Guzman  1,471 7,278  1  71.7  44.5 
27  Chalatenango La  Laguna  993  5,111  1  71.1  47.1 
28  La Paz  Paraiso de 
Osorio  639 2,933  1  76.4  44.8 
29  Chalatenango  Ojos de Agua  773  3,536  1  71.8  50.6 
30  Chalatenango Las  Vueltas  418  2,045  1  75.1  45.7 
31  Usulatan Estanzuelas  2,097 10,102 1  68.2  44.3 
32  Chalatenango Potonico 372  1,582  1  76.3 47.3 26  Country Study  nº 9 
 
33  San Miguel  Nuevo Eden de 
San Juan  623 3,160  2  62.8  39.5 
34  La Libertad  Jucalapa  1,142 6,056  2  63.9  41.6 
35  La Union  Lislique  2,700  13,790  2  63.6  37.0 
36  Cabanas Dolores  1,182 6,143  2  64.6  37.9 
37  Sonsonate  Santa Isabel 
Ishuatan  1,885 9,790  2  60.6  40.8 
38  Morazan Cacaopera  2,044  9,351  2  68.5  40.9 
39  Usulatan  San Francisco 
Javier  1,439 6,058  2  72.6  40.6 
40  Morazan Corinto  3,129  16,402  2  65.1  35.6 
41  Morazan Yamabal  807 3,880  2  63.6  38.8 
42  Ahuachapan Jujutla  5,655  28,059  2  59.9  35.7 
43  San Miguel  Sesori  2,263  11,379  2  54.8  32.1 
44  Ahuachapan Tacuba  4,529 22,425 2  68.1  42.2 
45  Cuscatlan  Monte San 
Juan  1,665 8,973  2  64.3  34.8 
46  Morazan Arambala  427 2,129  2  58.3  31.2 
47  Morazan Chilanga  1,715 8,358  2  65.5  38.7 
48  Morazan San  Fernando  373  1,924  2  66.8  38.1 
49  Morazan Sensembra  692  3,127 2  63.7  40.3 
50  Sonsonate  Santa Catarina 
Masahuat  1,702 8,635  2  74.5  34.6 
51  La Libertad  Teotepeque  2,730 14,108 2  58.5  34.3 
52  San Miguel  San Gerardo  1,093 5,579  2  54.8  33.6 
53  Chalatenango Nueva  Trinidad  342  1,896  2  65.5  40.4 
54  Morazan Lolotiquillo  1,020 4,867  2  63.2  33.7 
55  Cuscatlan San  Cristobal  1,337  7,130  2  60.5  31.3 
56  San Vicente  San Ildefonso 1,811 8,704  2  60.4  36.1 
57  Ahuachapan  San Pedro 
Puxtla  1,662 8,411  2  70.6  39.4 
58  La Libertad  Comasagua  2,418 11,155 2  60.3  35.8 
59  Chalatenango Agua  Caliente 1,753 8,027  2  57.3  32.9 
60  La Libertad  Chiltiupan  2,172 10,988 2  55.2  36.3 
61  Cabanas Victoria  2,790 14,796 2  65.9  42.1 
62  Usulatan Alegria  2,540  13,813  2  74.1  36.8 
63  Usulatan Tecapan  2,593 11,475 2  64.5  35.5 
64  Chalatenango  San Antonio de 
La Cruz  386 2,113  2  64.8  42.8 
65  San Miguel  Ciudad Barrios  6,131  29,664  2  59.6  32.9 
66  Usulutan  Concepcion 
Batres  2,931 13,086 2  57.0  30.8 
67  Usulutan Berlin  3,712  17,952  2 64.9  35.2 
68  Usulutan Ozatlan  2,709 12,140 2  58.8  31.1 
69  Chalatenango Las  Flores 490  2,072  2  68.0  41.8 
70  La Paz  San Emiglio  531  2,689  2  62.1  38.8 
71  La Paz  San Miguel 
Tepezontes  1,011 4,629  2  70.0  38.0 
72  La Paz  Santa Maria 
Ostuma  1,249 5,660  2  63.1  34.0 
73  La Union  Yayantique  1,230 5,412  2  58.4  32.0 
74  San Miguel  San Jorge  2,168 9,641  2  55.4  34.4 International Poverty Centre  27 
 
 
75  Usulatan  Mercedes 
Uamana  2,933 13,866 2  60.4  34.8 
76  Chalatenango El  Carrizal  561  2,757  2  71.7  40.3 
77  San Vicente  San Lorenzo  1,270 6,178  2  66.1  37.9 
78  La Paz  San Juan 
Tepezontes  758 3,190  2  64.4  36.0 
79  San Vicente  Apastepeque  3,541 18,247 2  62.5  33.1 
80  Chalatenango  Nombre de 
Jesus  871 4,341  2  62.7  36.3 
81  Usulutan Jacuaran  3,047 12,846 2  65.9  31.4 
82  Cabanas Ilobasco  11,938  66,259  2  60.4  31.0 
83  Morazan El  Rosario  257  1,076  2  63.4  31.5 
84  Chalatenango Comalapa  998  4,364  2  64.6  40.0 
85  Cuscatlan  Santa Cruz 
Analquito  561 2,387  2  62.7  36.5 
86  La Paz  San Pedro 
Nonualco  2,017 9,430  2  59.7  32.6 
87  Cuscatlan El  Rosario  737  3,762 2  60.2  33.5 
88  Cabanas Tejutepeque  1,258 5,863  2  60.5  36.0 
89  La Union  San Jose da la 
Fuente  962 3,975  2  57.1  31.3 
90  Morazan  Delicias de 
Concepcion  1,029 4,749  2  59.9  30.1 
91  La Paz  San Antonio 
Masahuat  831 4,047  2  60.4  33.6 
92  Chalatenango  San Luis del 
Carmen  501 1,700  2  65.9  37.7 
93  La Paz  Tapalhuaca  907  3,612  2  53.5  32.2 
94  San Vicente  Verapaz  1,812  7,803  2  64.2  31.8 
95  Santa Ana  Santa Rosa 
Guachipilin  1,398 6,185  2  57.6  32.6 
96  Usulutan Santa  Elena  3,389 15,476 2  56.2  31.7 
97  Cuscatlan Tenancingo  1,692  7,858  2  52.3  30.1 
98  Chalatenango  Concepcion 
Quezaltepeque  1,482 6,387  2  61.7  31.9 
99  Chalatenango  San Miguel de 
Mercedes  569 2,438  2  56.1  34.5 
100  Chalatenango  San Francisco 
Lempa  262 1,067  2  57.4  31.9 
Source: Flacso, 2005. 28  Country Study  nº 9 
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1. International policy learning and external influence, especially from the World Bank and the Inter-American 
Development Bank, also played an important role in the agenda setting and technical design of the programme.  
2. Executive Decree n. 11, of March 4th, 2005, modified by Executive Decree n. 42, of May 16th, 2005. 
3. The Red’s legal document limits its duration to 2009 but the programme’s conceptual document includes goals 
for 2010-2015 and refers explicitly to the MDGs. 
4. Nevertheless, the same poverty assessment shows surprising data related to recent poverty dynamics among 
the rural and urban populations. In the first half of the 1990s, economic growth was able to reduce poverty, 
particularly among the moderate poor and the urban poor. This process slowed down after 1995 and  
decelerated further in the 2000s, due to domestic factors, exogenous shocks and natural disasters. This reduced 
considerably the pace with which the country was able to improve the conditions of the rural poor, but the 
urban poor seemed to be even more affected: urban poverty actually increased between 2000 and 2002 (World 
Bank, 2005). This might be related to the effect of migrant’s remittances, which have had greater poverty 
impacts in rural areas (PNUD, 2003). 
5. Although poverty trends in El Salvador seem to be consistent regardless of the methodology used, the statistics 
regarding current estimates and the speed of poverty reduction throughout the 1990s are controversial (PNUD, 2003). 
6. There is some ambiguity in the use of the terms ‘poverty’ and ‘extreme poverty’ in Red’s documents. The poverty 
line in El Salvador is officially calculated as twice the costs of a basic food basket (US$ 2.12 dollars per person per day in 
urban areas and US$ 1.33 dollars per person per day in rural areas). The extreme poverty line is equivalent to the costs of 
one basic food basket (FLACSO, 2005). However, these values are contested and might be underestimated (PNUD, 2003). 
7. While this is generally regarded as an empowering tool for women, Molyneux (2006) warns against 
overemphasizing the ‘maternalistic’ gender role in the poverty agenda epitomized by CCTs.  
8. A field visit during pay day provided anecdotal evidence in this regard. Beneficiaries of a remote district 
complained about having to rent a truck to drive them to the payment location at dawn, wait for all of them to 
receive their stipend and bring them back home. The whole operation would take the whole morning and cost 
around US$ 2.50 per person (an amount considered an overestimate, however, by programme managers).  
9. Despite formally including pre-school enrolment and attendance co-responsibilities, the Red does not always 
enforce the schooling conditionality for children younger than seven years old, due primarily to supply constraints. 
10. The schedule for check-ups and the immunizations protocol vary by children’s age. 
11. In a sense, the family sustainability component of Red Solidaria seems to have been put in place to deal with 
this issue, since it encompasses productive projects and microcredit schemes as income generation or 
diversification mechanisms. However, as will be discussed below, this component has not received much attention 
in the programme and its links with the CCT component are weak. 
12. An exception seems to be Bolsa Familia in Brazil, which has no time limit for the receipt of benefits but uses 
registry updating mechanisms and consistency checks for the verification of family eligibility for the programme. 
13. These additional parameters were not detailed in the programme’s operational manual, but in the new operational 
guideline for the municipal committees. They are in the process of being publicized among committee members. 
14. Calculations on the basis of the statistics presented in the poverty map suggest that poverty would affect 
between 66 per cent and 89 per cnet of the households in the 32 municipalities of the first cluster (FLACSO, 2005). 
15. In the second cluster, poverty levels would range between 52 per cent and 74 per cent (own calculations, based 
on FLACSO, 2005). 
16. Although every committee receives a paper and electronic copy of the municipality’s maps, there are no 
specific instructions or suggestions on how they could be used and who should be in charge of storing and 
handling them. Apparently, the FISDL local representative ends up being the person responsible for them. This 
casts some doubt about the real use of these inputs by local stakeholders. Moreover, the mere possession of a 
digital format of the maps might not be sufficient to ensure that they can be utililized at the local level, as they 
usually require specific cartographic software to be viewed or printed out. 
17. The operational manual of the Red includes an Indigenous Development Plan, which determines not only the 
inclusion of specific questions in the census, but also the inclusion of inter-cultural themes in the family training 
sessions of the CCT component of the programme and other activities that take into account specificities of the 
indigenous culture. For most of the programme managers interviewed, however, this Plan resulted much more 
from a donor concern than a country demand. This reflects the controversial nature of the indigenous issue in  
El Salvador. It is important to bear in mind that in the second half of the 20th century, El Salvador underwent a 
process of denial of its indigenous ancestry. This resulted in a debate on the ‘invisibility’ of this population for the 
purposes of public policies (PNUD, 2003). International Poverty Centre
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